RECENT CASES
ACTIONS-COTRACT OR TORT-QUASI CONTRACT-In Stanton v. Phila.

& Reading Ry. Co., 236 Pa. 419 (1912), it was held that assumpsit was the
proper action where there was an allegation of a breach of an agreement on the
part of the carrier to use reasonable care to preserve the plaintiff's shipment.
altholigh the breach was due to negligence; that the doctrine of waiver of tort
was not involved.
It is a general principle that where a breach of a contract, express or implied, amounts to a tort a party may sue for breach of the contract or sue for
the tort. Ex contractu actions: Reilly v. White, 234 Pa. 115 (1912); Carland
v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 118 Mich. 369 (1898). Ex delicto actions: Eckert
v. Penna. R. R., 211 Pa. 267 (19o5); Stock v. Boston, 149 Mass. 410 (1889).
Where there is no legal duty except that arising from a contract, there can not
be an election between an action on contract and one in tort, for there is no
tort; in such case there can be no action except upon the contract. Parill v.
Cleveland etc. R. Co., 23 Ind. App. 638, 648 (1899). Galveston Ry. Co. v.
Hennegan, 33 Tex. Cir. App. 314 (19o3), held that, for failure of employer to
furnish medical attendance to employee as he had agreed, the action must be
ex conlractu for there was no legal duty extrinsic to the contract; the court also
pointed out that if the medical treatment had been undertaken the law would
impose a duty to use reasonable care, for breach of which an action ex ddicao
could be maintained.

Where a tort is committed which results in a profit or advantage to the
tort feasor, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit on the fiction
of an implied promise. Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. Ray. 1216 (1705); Norden
v. Jones, 33 Wis. 6oo (1873); Braithwaite v. Akin, 3 N. D. 365 (1893); Terry
v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161 (189o). A minority of the jurisdictions hold that
the tort cannot be waived where the goods converted are merely retained or
consumed and not reduced to cash. Bethlehem v. Perseverance Fire Co., 81 Pa.
445 (1876); Woodruff v. Zaban, 133 Ga.
652 (1889).
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(19o9); Tuttle v. Campbell, 74 Mich.

Where one person commits a tort against another without any intention
of benefiting his own estate and his own estate is not thereby benefited, the law
will not imply or presume a contract on the part of such wrongdoer to pay resulting damages. Webster v. Drinkwater, 5 Me. 319 (1828); Tightmeyer v.
Mongold, 20 Kan. 90 (1878); Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 44o (x862); Ingersoll
v. Moss, 44 Ill.
App. 72 (189!).
BILLS AND NOTES-WuAT IS AN I. DORSEME.T-In Hendrix v. Banhard

Bros., 75 S. E. Rep. 588 (Ga., 1912), it was held that, where the payees in a
promissory note payable to order wrote on the back of it the words: For value
received we hereby warrant the makers of the note financially good in execution," and signed their names after such entry, such was an indorsement sufficient to transfer title to the note, and, if made before maturit to a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice of any defense, such purchaser would be
protected from any defenses which the maker might have except those expressly
allowed by statute.
This follows the rule already established in that state, Vanzant v. Arnold,
3 Ga. 210 (186o), and is in accord with the prevailing view as early expressed
in England, Richards v. Frankum, 9 Car. & P. 221 (1840), and by the majority
of decisions in the United States. Partridge v. Davis, 20 Vt. 499 (1848); Burrett v. May, 2 Bailey I (S. C., 183o); Williams v. Hagar, 50 Me. 9 (1861); Bissell
v. Gowdy, 31 Conn. 47 (1862); Judson v. Gookwin, 37 Ill. 286 (1865); Mullen
v. Jones, 102 Minn. 72 (1907); Robinson v. Lair, 31 Iowa 9 (1870); Heard v.
Dubuque Co. Bank, 8 Neb. 10 (1878); Donnerberg v.Oppenheimer, 15 Wash.
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(1896); Kellogg v.Douglas Co. Bank. 58 Kan. 43 (1897); Bank v. McElfish
Clay M'f'g. Co., 48 W. 'a.
4o6 (19oo); Delsman v. Friedlander, 40Ore. 33 (1goi).
On the other hand, it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United
States anti some inferior federal courts, and by the courts of two or three states,
that any entry of a guaranty, followed by the signature of the payee on the
back of a note payable to order, does not amount to such an inclorsement as to
carry th. title and cut off the defenses existing against the paper. Central
Trubt Co. v. First Nat. Bank, oi U.S. 68 (1879); Omaha Nat. Bank v.Walker,
290

. Fed. 399 (Neb., 1881); Laniourieux v. Hewitt, 5 Wend. 307 (N. Y., 183o);
Miller v. Gabton, 2 Hill 188 (N. Y., 1842); Snevily v. Ekel, I Watts & S. 2o3

(Pa.. 1841); Edgerlv v. l.awson, 176 Mass. 551 (19oo). Some of the earlier
cases in Massachusetts seem inclined to take the other view. Blakely v.Grant,
6 Mass. 386 (181o); Uphan v. Prince, 12 Mass. 14 (ISS).
CONTRACTS- INFANT'S

.IAlILITY-E'D'CATION

AS

A NECESSTY-Inter-

national Text Book Co. v.Connelly, 99 N. E. Rep. 722 (N. Y., 1912) holds that
a cour-e of instruction with a Correspondence SLhool in civil engineering, covering a period of five years, is not a necessary for an infant living with a guardian,
able and willing to furnish him with everything suitable and necessary to his
position in life.
It is a general proposition, well supported by authority, that a minor cannot bind himself for what are primafacie necessaries where fiis
wants are already
supplied. Burkhart v. Angers-tein, 6 Car. & P. 69o (1833); Johnstone v. Marks,
19 Q. B. D. 5o9 (1887); Decell v. I.ewenthall, 57 Miss. 531 (1879); Trainer v.
Trumball. 141 Mass. 530 (1886). Or where he has a parent or guardian able
and willing to provide for him. McKanna v. Merry, 61 IIL 177 (1871); Conbory v. Howe, 59 Conn. 112 (189o); Davis v.Caldwell, 12 Cush. 512 (Mass.,
1853). If he have no parent or guardian able to provide for him, he is liable,
but even in such cases, the necessaries must be suitable to the circumstances
and condition in life of the minor. Walter v. Everard, 2 Q. B. 374 (1891);
Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N. C. 110 (1874); Strong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 205 (1875).
The term "necessary" has been held to include a common school education, Middlebury College v. Chandler, I6 Vt. 686 (t844), and a trade, Pardley
v. Ship Wendlass Co., 2o R. I. 147 (1897); but it has been held not to include a
collegiate or a professional education. .Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16
Vt. 683 (1844); Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357 (1880).
CONTRACTS-REWARDS-PERFORMANCE-A
master offered a reward to his
servants 'ho would be employed for 4,5oo hours in Ioo consecutive weeks.
The servant signed a written contract for hire which contained no stipulation
regarding the reward, and he was discharged one day too soon to earn the reward. 1ield, that it was a question for the jury whether the servant had made a
substantial compliance, and when prevented by the offeror or his agent from
completing the work, he is entitled to the whole or at least.to compensation
quantum meruit. Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 137 N. W. Rep. 769, (Vis.,
1912).

In the light of modern social and economic thought, this case is very
important for nearly all the large corporations are arranging some scheme of
profit-sharing for their servants. And although a case of this exact nature is
new, yet it is governed by principles which were laid down in cases of rewards
for information, apprehension and conviction of criminals.
A literal compliance by the offeree is not necessary. Besse v. Dyer, 9 Allen,
151 (Mass., 1864); Haskell v. Davidson, 91 Me. 488 (1898). In general, a substantial performance and compliance is sufficient. Gilkey v. Barley, 2 Harr.
359 (Del. 1838); Williams v. R. R., x91 I1. 61o (19oi); Salbadore v. Insurance
Co., 22 La. Ann. 338 (187o); Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248, (1868). Eseially so where the offeror has made it impossible for the offeree to complete,
Louisville R. R. v. Goodnight, 1o Bush, 552, (Ky. 1874), as in principal case.
And although the offeror can make his own stipulations, yet it can be claimed
by one who has complied with the terms, according to the true construction
of the offer. Comm. v. Edwards, ioPhila. 215 (Pa., 1874); Peterson v. Mark,
134 Mich. 594 (19o3); Wilson v. Stump, 1o3 Cal. 255. (1894).
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CRIMINAL IAw-BURDEN OF PROVING SELF-DE:FENSE-In Minnesota, in
a case of a.atult, the trial judge refused defendant's reque-t that the jury be instructed that "no burden of proof re .ted on defendant to prove that he acted in
self-'hefense; the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to .atisfy or convince
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the defendant was not
self-defense.
On appeal, it wa held that the instruction requested
stated the law and it. was error to refu.e it. State v. McGrath, 138 N. properly
W. Rep.
3io (Minn., Ijo2). Th. general rule is that when a person is without fault,
is in a place where liehas a right to be. and is assaulted, he has a right to defend him.elf against the threatened1 or attempted a-sault. If. therefore, it is
shown that in the reasonable exe-rci-e of this right he inflicted bodily injury
otihis assailant, his act is justifiable or excustable. State V. Ilays. 23 M\o. .287
(1856). The burden of proving slf-defense is the same in assault as in crimes
of a higher grade.
- There is a conflict of authority as to whether the burden is on the state or
the accused. Some cases, hold that when the state has established the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused pleads self-defense, the burden is
on him to .how it by a preponderance of evidence. State v. Yates, 155 N. C.
450 (19 1): Turner v. State. 5 Ohio Ar. Ct. R. 537 (1891); Cot. v. Colandro,
231 Pa. 343 (910.
But where he has made out his case of self-defense, the
burden of proving that he was at fault in bringing about the difficulty has been
held to be upon the state. Holmes v. State, too Ala. so (1893). Other jurisdictions place the burden upot the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a killing was not excusable by reason of self-defense. State v. Sharp, 127
]a. 526 (19o5); Gravely v. State, 38 Neb. 871 (1894); People v. Riordan. 3 N.
Y. Suppl. 774 (1888).
CRIMIN3AL

PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT-NEG.LTIVIG

EXCEPTION

IN

STAT-

UTE-A statute of West Virginia prohibits the sale of cocaine except on the
prescription of a licensed physician in good standing. In a recent case, under
the statute, the Supreme Court quashed an indictment which did not aver that
the defendant acted without a prescription. State v. Weir, 76 S. E. Rep 138
(W. Va., 1912).
It is often a nice question whether an exception in a statute must be negatived in the indictment or whether it simply forms matter of defense, in which
case such allegation would be unnecessary. In many cases the position of the
exception in the statute has been made the test. Thus it has been held that
when exceptions are contained in independent and distinct 'clauses, it is unnecessary to allege in the indictment that the defendant is not within the exception. State v. Cassady, 5z N. H. 5oo (1872): State v. Williams. 2o Ga.
98 (1865); Gratlay v. State, 7 Ala. 344 (1882); Com. v. Shelly, 2 Kulp. 300
(Pa., 1883). And it is generally held that when the exception comes in the
enacting clause it must be negatived, but not when it appears in a subsequent
clause or statute. U. S. v. Moore. II Fed. 248 (i88z); Elkins v. State, 13 Ga.
435 (1853); Williams v. Srate. 20 11. App. 92 (1886); State v. George, 93 N..C.
567 (1885); Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519 (1860).
Other courts have disregarded the relative position of exceptions in the
statute, and have declared that such as form a part of the description of the
offense must be negatived wherever they may appear. State v. Miller, 24
Conn. 522 tz856); U. S. v. McCormick. I Cranch C. C. 593 (U. S., 18io); People
v. Pierce. 11 Hun. 633 (N. Y., I87-); State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60 (1856). The
real question in each case is as to the nature of the crime intended to be created;
that is, a general crime embracing all people for which, however, there may be
an excuse like self defense in homicide; ora particular crime only affecting a class,
like the sale of liquor by those whu have not licenses- It is only in the latter
case that negation of the exception is necessary, and in such case it must appear
to bring the defendant within the class intended by the statute. Such exceptions properly describe the offense, and nearly always appear in the enacting
clause; the courts in most cases, therefore, achieve a common result whether
they regard the nature of the act or the formal position in it of an exception.
GAMING-RECOVEitY BACK OF MONEY GIVEN FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSE-

RECENT CA.SES
Money given to another to phce on an election bet, if it has not been so placed
may fie recovered, as up to that point the transaction is not nullified by the
laus again:t gaming. Klock v. Brown, 137 N. V. Rep. 636 (Mich., 1912).
As a general principle. collateral contracts in the promotion of gambling
are affe.t ted by their illegal purpose and are rendered incapable of enforcement,
as in 3adt.lv v. Beale. 3 Vatts. 263 (l'a.. 1834). A~hich decided a billiard marker
could not at law recover his wages because the nature of the business was unla-,ful and "a contract growing out of a transaction whose.known tendency
was to encourage a breach of laws was illegal." In Bates v.Clifford. 22 Minn.
52 (1875), a bet had been made between the buyer and seller of a horse; $5oo
or $135 was to be its price depending on the result of an election; the court refused to enforce the contract antI judicially regarded the transaction as a gift.
The vendee of socme poker chips was paid by an indorsed check, which he cashed.
He was held not a "holder in due course" and the payee was allowed to recover
from the bank. Driverall v. Morris State Bank, 88 N. W. Rep. 724 (N. D.,
1901).

While a wager is illegal, W1heller v. Spencer. 15 Conn. 28 (1844), the funds
held by a stakeholder may be recovered front hint by the one who places the
bet. In Conklin v. Conway. 18 Pa. 328 (1852), it was found impossible to
settle the Let satisfactorily and recovery uas allowed; so also in Tribleton v.
Baker, 18 Vt. 9 (1873), a loser notified the stakeholder after the result of the
election was decided, but before the money had been paid over, not to pay
the bet and, the stakeholder paying it, the court held bim responsible for the
amount. This right to recover is so well recognized that funds in the hands
of a stakeholder may be assigned.
On the other hand, when money has been lent another for gambling purposes and so employed, no recovery may be had from the borrower, White v.
Bass, 57 Mass. 448 (1849), and the cases which deny a recovery because of
speculation are based on this principle. Gibney v. Olivette, 196 Mass. 294

(1907).
HOMICIDE-DISCRETION OF COURT ,1NORDERING AvToPsy-In a murder

trial, it was held that if a court has power to order the body of the victim to be
disinterred for examination for evidential purposes, it should only be invoked
when plainly neces.ary and essential to the justice and fairness of the trial.
Being a matter in the discretion of the court, it may be refused and such refu.al, as a rule, is not reviewable as cause for reversal. State v. Highland, 76
S. E. Rep. 140 (W. Va., 1912).
The common law recognized no property in the dead bodies of human
beings. Hockenhamer v. Lexington Co., 74 S. W. Rep. 222 (Ky., 1903). -Even
now it cannot be said that the heir or next of kin has strictly property in the
remains; but they have the right of burial, protecting the graves and the like.
Though, therefore, it is not regarded as property in the ordinary sense, a corpse
is nevertheless, in recognition of the universal sentiment of mankind, protected
by the courts. Anderson v. Acheson, 132 Iowa 744 (1907).
There is very little authority on the question discussed in the principal
case, as to whether a court has the right to order the disinterment of a corpse
for evidential purposes, and that is mostly of an indirect nature. Moss v.
State. 152 Ala. 3o (19o7); Salesbury v. CoM., 79 Ky. 425 (1889). That under
certain circumstances, disinterment of corpses for evidential purposes may be
ordered in civil actions was held to be the law in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Griesa,
156 Fed. 398 (i9o7). In Gray v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 9o (igo8), it was held
likewise that the right of relatives of a deceased person to have his corpse remain undi.trubed after burial must •ield to public interests, and that in a prosecution for homicide the exhumation of the remains of the victim may be ordered, upon the application of the state or the defendant, uhen it appears to
be ahsolutely essential to the administration of justice. According to another
case. however, it seems that the consent of the next of kin is necessary.[ Moss
v. State, 152 Ala. 3o (1907).
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HiUSBAND-STAmUTFS-

The provision-§ 4o8 Revisal of Ccde (N. C.)-that a wifekmay maintain an
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action without joinder of her husband (i) when the action concerns her separate
property, or (2) when the action is between herself and her husband, is construed
in Graves v. Htoward, eal. 75S. E. Rep.998 (N. C., 19!2) to conferupon the wife
the right to recover upon a mortgage (acquired by gift) held against her husband.
This decision accords with those of many jurisdictions which place a liberal
construction on the general statutes enacted in derogation of the common law
rule refusing a feme corert the right to maintain actions at law to secure her
separate property and rights. Clough v. Russell, 55 N. H. 279 (1875); re Deaner
Est., 126 Iowa, 701 (0o5); Trayer v. .'tzer,72 Nebr. 845 (1904); Bishop v.
Bourgeois, 58 N. 1. Eq. 417 (1899). Such statutes are not to be confined to
express power. Grube v. Grube. 26 Ore. 363 (1894); Crater v. Crater, 1i8
Ind. 521 (888); Wood v. gAood, 83 N. Y. 575 (iS-z); Wright v. Wright, 54 N.
Y. 437 (1873). She may sue upon contractual obligations due her from a firm
of which her husband is a member. Kutz's Appeal, 40 Pa. 9o (1861); Benson
v. Morgan. 5o Mich. 77 (1883); Matthewson v. •Matthewson, Conn. 25 (19o6).
In equity, Devin v. Devin, 17 How Pr. 514; Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 164 (N.
Y., 1870). But contra, neither in law nor equity, Edwards v. Stephens, 3 Allen,
315 (Mass., 1862); Clark v. Patterson, 158 Mass. 388 (1893).
Opposed to this current of decisions are those requiring a strict interpretation of such statutes, and opposing any expansion by implication. Kalfus v.
Kalfus, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 839 (1891): Crowther v. Crowther, 55 Me. 358 (1867);
Webster v. Webster, 58 Me. 139 (187o); Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214 (1869);
Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396 (1858), interpreting the Act of Apr. 1i, 1848; Edwards v. Stephens, 3 Allen. 315 (Mass., 1862). To warrant recovery upon a
contractual obligation owed by the husband, there is a burden upon a femr
covert of proving that the consideration given was a part of her separate estate.
even though she were authorized to trade as a ferne sole. Leahy V. Leahy, 97
Ky. 59 (1895); Heacock v. Heacock, io8 Iowa, 54o (1899).
INSURANcE-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-ILLEGAL CONTRACT-Wihere a life
insurance company issues policies, in which the applicants state that all representations and agreements are reduced to writing therein, they are not bound
by an agreement made by the agent without the knowledge or authority of the
company to return the premiums and cancel the policies, if a mortgage loan
for a large amount is not made by the company to the applicants within thirty
days from the date of the agreement. Reed v. Phila. Life Ins. Co., 5o Pa.
Sup. 384 (1912). The company refused the loan and the insured sued for the
premiums paid. The court denied recovery on three grounds: (i) such agreement was not referred to in the application; (2) was not within the authorit
of the agent to make; (3) violation of the Act of May 3, 1909, P. L 405, which
forbids rebates of premiums and the making of any agreement as to lie insurance
other than is plainly expressed in the policy.
Though the company is liable for any acts of the agent which are within
the general scope of his apparent authority, National Mut. Fire Insur. Co. v.
Barns, 41 Kan. 161 (1889); Rivara v. Insur. Co., 62 Miss. 721 (885), they are
not bound when the agent waives the provisions of a policy in a matter outside
the scope of his agency. Insur. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa. 46o (1888); Kyte v.
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 144 Mass. 43 (1887).
Such agreements as are inconsistent with the terms of the original written
contract are not binding upon the company, Ridgeway Co. v. Cement Co.,
221 Pa. x6o 09o8); and where the relation of principal and agent exists, before
an unauthorized act of the agent can be said to be ratified by the principal, he
must have full knowledge of all the material facts and circumstances attending
the transaction. Daley v. Iselin, 218 Pa. 515 (1907); R. R. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa.
340 (1858). Thus the principal can not be held when it is shown the agent was
guilty of an act not within the scope of his employment nor within any of his
implied powers. Greene v. Insur. Co., 91 Pa. .387 (1879). But even where the
act of the agent is one in which the principal is bound, the law will not lend its
support to a claim founded on its own violation. Coppell v. Hall, 7 Vallace.
542 (1868). If a plaintiff cannot open his case without showing that he has
broken the law, a court will not assist him. Thomas v. Brody, xo Barr, 164
(1848). Generally the test is whether the plaintiff requires the illegal transaction
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to establish his case. Holt -. Green, 73 Pa. 198 (1873). The acts of theagent
in the principal case were. in the opinion of the court, undoubtedly a violation
of the state statute, supra, though in a lower court deci.ion, Spangler Brewing
Co. v. Ins. Co., 58 Pitts. I.-J. 313 (igio), similar transactions were not considered in the light of rebates.
JtivY-Jt'DICIAL OATH BlYUNBELIEVER-A juror stated that he believed in
a Supreme Power, did not believe in future rewards or punishments, had no
fear of personal punishment and did not believe in either the Old or New Testament. After making such statement, he took the usual oath and qualified
as a juror despite the defenlant's challenge for cause. On appeal, it was held
that he was not disqualified front serving as a juror. State v. Jackson, z37
N. W. Rep. 1034 (Iowa, igi2). The court in discussing the objections to the
juror said, "lie possessed all statutory qualifications and was not subject to
challenge for cause (on account of his statements). He took the oath without
objection, evidencing the fact that he regarded it as binding on his conscience.
Under modern rules oaths are to be administered to all persons according to
their own opinions, and as it most affects their consciences. If not objected
to or protested as to form, it will be assumed that the person taking it regards
it as binding on his conscience in the absence of proof to the contrary."
There is apparently no absolutely clear decision as to whether one is disqualified to serve by want of religious belief. But it has been held that even
if this is ground for disqualification, it is not available after trial. McClure v.
State, 1 Yerg. 206 (Tenn., 1829). It was also held proper to exclude one who
had grossly misbehaved himself as juror in another case and who was destitute
of any religious belief. McFadden v. Corn., 23 Pa. 12 (1853). Where a statute required that jurors should be electors and provided that electors must not
belong to any orzanization teaching bigamy or polygamy, a Morman was held
not to be a competent juror. Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 627 (189o),
LIMITATIONS OF AcTioNs-ALIENAToN OF AFFECTIONs-In an action by
the husband for criminal conversations and alienation of wife's affections, the
defendant, inter alia, pleaded the statute of limitations.
i. Section 2 (Comp. Stat. 3164, i9io) "all actions of trespass for assault
shall be commenced and sued within four years."
....
2. Section 3 (Comp. Stat. 3164, i9io) "all actions hereafter accruing for
injuries to persons . . . . shall be commenced and instituted within two
years."
It was held upon demurrer that Section 2 did not apply, as the action for
criminal conversation was in effect on action upon the case; nor did Section 3
apply as this action was clearly not an injury to the person, but to the relative
rights of the individual, and "injury to the person" is not equivalent to "injury to the personal rights," therefore it is not barred until six years. Crane
v. Ketchem, 84 At. Rep. 1052 (N. J., 1912).
The rule now is, as opposed to the old common law rule, that the action
of criminal conversation is an action on the case. Sanborn v. Neilson, 5 N. H.
314 (t8.30); accord, Clough v. Terry, 5 Me. 446 (1828); Van Vacter v. McKelley's,
7 Blkf. 578 (Ind., t845).
But there is a distinct conflict upon the meaning of the phrase injury to
person," in statutes similar to the above. In Hutchenson v. Burden, u13 Ga.
987 (19 11), it was held "'injuries to the person,' as understood by the codifiers
and within that scheme of classifications adopted in the Code, was not confined
to mere physical or bodily injuries, but embraced all actionable injuries to the
Bennett v. Bennett,
person himself, as distinguished from his property."
II6 N. Y. 584 (z889), "injury to the person, within the meaning of the law,
includes certain acts which do not involve physical contact with the person
injured," as a wife's right to sue for alienation of her husband; acc. Farneman
v. Farneman, go N. E. Rep. 775 (Ind., 19o); Taylor v. Bliss, 57 Atl. Rep. 939
(R. 1., 1904). Criminal conversation is a "personal injury" to husband, Delmater v. Russell, 4 How. Pr. 234 (N. Y. ,8o). Blackstone seems to haveregarded the alienation as a personal injury, 3 Black. i39. It is analogous to the
actions for mental anguish, disappointment, sorrow, etc., resulting from
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non delivery of a telegram which are injuries to the person within meaning of
a ztatute, Kelly v. %N.Union Tel. Co., 77 Tex. Civ. App. 344, (1897); contra
W. Union v. Witt. 33 Ky: L. Rep. 685 (1908).
Cases in accord with the principal case are: Clow v. Chapman, 26 L. R. A.
412 (Mo., 1894); Sanborn V. Gale, 26 L. R. A.864 (Mass.. 1894). "Personal
rights" are not rights of the person. The latter are physical and the former
are relative and tzeneral and embrace the rights a person may have and the
vrongs he may suffer. Duflies v. Duffies, 8 L. R. A. 420 (Wis., 189o). A wife
was allowed to sue for the alienation of her husband's affections under a statute
giving her redress for injuries to "personal rights," Westlake v. Westlake, 34
Ohio St. 621 (1878); but was denied redress under a statute allowing her to sue
for injuries to "the person." Mulford v. Clewell. 21 Ohio 191 (1871). Under
a liquor statute allowing a wife to sue for injury "to her person," she was denied recoveiy for the loss of her husband's society. Calloway v. Laydon, 47
Iowa 456 (1877); ace. Freese v. Quipp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873). Lightwoods in
"Time Limit on Actions," p. 192 (Eng., 1909), classes alienation under "Injuries to Private Relations, Husband and Wife" and not under "Wrongs to the
Person. "
MINEs-RIGHT OF THE GRANTEE TO DttMP WASTE ON THE SURFAcE-As

against the owner of the surface land, the purchaser of minerals thereunder has
the right, without express words of grant for that purpose, to go upon the surface and use so much thereof as is strictly necessary to the operation of his estate; this carries with it the right to dump upon the surface the waste taken
from the workings under that land. Dewey v. Great Lakes Coal Co., 84 AtI.
Rep. 913 (Pa. Super., 1912). This case is confirmatory of a long line of Penn.
sylvania cases on mineral owner's rights over the land surface. Turner v.
Reynolds, 23 Pa. 199 (854); Tiley v. Moyers, 25 Pa. 397 (1855); Bronson v.
Lane, 91 Pa. 153 (1879); Potter v. Rend, 201 Pa. 318 (19o2). And in other
states: Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo. 6oo (09o); Porter v. Mack M'f'g. Co., 65
W. Va. 636 (19o9); Marvin v. Brewster Co., 55 N. V. 538 (1874); Williams v.
Gibson, 84 Ala. 228 (1887). The Pennsylvania courts have confirmed the
mineral owner's rights in the necessary use of the soil, "even as against the
owner of the soil." Turner v. Reynolds, 23 Pa. 199 (1854); Pringle v. Vesta
Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438 (1896).
But the use of the surface does not extend, except by express grant, to the
bringing out of minerals, and deposit of refuse from adjoining lands. Coal Co.
v. Schmisseur, 34 II1. App. 512 (189o); Rockafellow v. Hanover Coal Co., 12
C. C. R. 241 (Pa., 1892).
M UNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-PERSONAL

LIABILITY

OF OFFIcERS-A

city

treasurer who, without authority, signed an agreement to hold back, with the
contractor's permission, a part of a sum due the contractor for certain municipal
work, and to pay it to the contractor's assignee, is not personally liable, to such
partial assignee, for failure to do so. For, defendant's duties being statutory,
the plaintiff must be held to a knowledge of the fact that the defendant was
acting without authority because the act was ultra vires. Pittsburg-Buffalo
Co. v. Schmidt, 85 AtI. Rep. 2o (Pa., 1912).
The case is in accord with the authorities. The defendant's powers were
statutory and therefore clear. If the damage is due to mutual mistake of law
as to the officer's powers, he is nowhere liable. Huthsing v. Bourquet, 7 Fed.
833 (i88t); Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 1o6 (1873); Olifiers v. Belmont, 159
N. V. 55o (1899). Unless he has clearly assumed personal responsibility.
Schloss v. McIntyre. 147 Ala. 557 (9o6); Mann v. Richardson, 66 I11 48z
(1873). But if the injury accrued because of a mistake of fact, which is not
known to plaintiff, but which is known or ought to be known to the officer, the
latter is liable. McClenticks v. Bryant, I Mo. 598 (1820); School Directors
v. 'Miller, 54 III. 338 (1870). Such iontract in excess of his power renders the
officer peronally liable. Paulding v. Cooper, 74 N. Y. 619 (1877). The contract is an act in his private capacity for which he is liable. McClenticks v.
Bryant, supra; 'ulee v. Canova, it Fla. 9 (1864); State Bank v. Kienberger,
140 Wis. 517 (1909).

RECENT CASES
And such officers are liable for fraudulent representation of power to contract, in an action on the cast.
)uncan v. Niles. 32 I1. &32 (1$0.3).
Or for
clearabu-e ofauthority. Beruer v. Smith. 171 Fed. 735 (19oi). But the agent
does not warr,.nt the capacity of the principal to contract. Hall v. Lauderdale,
46 N. Y. 7o (1871).
.G-(;L(;%ENCE-RtLE
OF THlE Ro.io-Failure of an automobile driver to
pass to left of a trolley car going in the same direction, as required by
statute (R. L.. Mass., C. 54, 62). resulting in injury to a passenger who was
alighting on the right hand side from the trolley car, rendered such driver liable

as a matter of law for ,uch injur, no contributory negligence appearing.

Foster

v. Curtis, 99 N. E. Rep. 961 (Mass., 1912).

The purpose of all rules of the road is to protect and to facilitate travel.
They are made up of customs, ordinances and statutes. The criterion of liability is due care. They apply in general to all carriages and vehicles using the
road. Bicycles. Forte v. Am. Product Co., 195 Pa. 19o (19oo); tram or trolley
cars, Foster v. Curtis. supra, Burton v. Nichoison. (i9o9) I. K. B. .397 (Eng.),

are vehicles within the rule.
mower.

So a dang-rous wheeled machine like a lawn-

Fahrney v. O'Donell, 107 Ill.
App. 6o8 (19o3).

Cars on rails can-

not deviate from their line in passing other vehicles, but beyond that, must regard the right of other vehicles on or near the tracks. Baldie v. Tacoma R. Co.,
52 Wash. 75 (19o). And vehicles not confined by rails must pass trolley cars
as they would other vehicles. Foster v. Curtis, supra; Burton v. Nicholson,
supra.

Except when approaching another vehicle, a vehicle is not bound to travel
on any particular portion of the road. Brooks v. Ilart, 14 N. Ht. 307 (1843);
Smith v. Gardner, 77 Mass. 418 (1858). And even when about to pass another
vehicle, to drive upon the wrong side is not negligence as a matter of law. Wood
v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 161 (19oq); Spofford v. Harlow, 85 Mass.
176 (1861); contra, Brooks v. Hart, supra. But it is negligence sufficient to

bar recovery for injuries in any way attributable thereto. Winter v. Harris,
23 R. 1. 47 (9o).
The presumption is against the party on the wrong side,
Angell v. Lewis, 2o R. 1. 391 (1898), unless the proper line of travel is in improper condition, Loyacono v. Jurgers, 5o La. An. 441 (1898), or hidden in deep
scow, Smith v. Dygert, 12 Bart. 613 (. Y., 1852). An ambulance, Kellogg v.
Church Foundation, 135 N. Y. App. 839 (i909), and fire apparatus, People v.
Mahoney, 65 N. Y..Mie. 449 (19o9), in performance of duty, may within reason
disregard the law of the road.
A person properly using a highway has a right to presume that other vehicles will observe the law of the road. Angell v. Lewis, supra; Foote v. Am.
Product Co., supra; Curtis v. Foster, supra. Unless the circumstances render
reliance upon such presumption reckless. Baker v. Pendergast, 32 Ohio 494
(1877).
An exception to the usual rule of the road is that a light vehicle must give
way to a heavily laden vehicle. Foote v. Am. Product Co., supra.
N-UISAscE--INJtcnION-STATUTORY

NVISANcE-In

a recent

case

in

North Carolina the Supreme Court refused to enjoin the erection of a sawmill,
althaugh such erection was prohibited by a city ordinance, when the plaintiff
offered merely speculative ant not tangible proof that the mill when built
would in fact be a nuisance, and that special injury peculiar to himself
would result. Berger v. Smith, 75 S. E. Rep. io98 (N. C., 1912):
It seems to be well settled that a declaration by municipal ordinance of what
shall constitute a nuisance is not absolute, and that the courts will still consider
the reasonableness of each particular case. Yates v. Milwaukee, to Wall. 497
(U. S., 187o); Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 93 (1887). In the principal case
the court, following this principle, looked beyond the fact that the defendant was
violating an ordinance, and found that the plaintiff had offered no conclusive
goof that his mill would be in fact a nuisance when completed. But if the court
ad taken the view that the construction of the mill constituted a nuisance
er se because forbidden by ordinance, or if they believed that it would in fact
ecome a nuisance, the plaintiff must still have failed because he did not show
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special injury peculiar to hims-If and distinct from that suffered by other members of the public. High on Injunctions, 4th Ed. H 757 etseq.; Spooner v. McConnell, i McLean 337 (W.S., 1838); Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn.
565 (x845); I.ow v. Knowlton, 26 Me. 128 (1846); Hill v. City of New Vork,
63 Hun. 633 (N. Y.- 1893); Peterson v. Navv Yard, 5 Phila. 199 (Pa.. 1863).
Moreover, it is settled that there must be evidence of more than possible or
speculative injury to warrant the iisuance of an injunction.
The courts are slow to restrain construction on the prospect of future
350 (1886); Rhodes
development into a nuiance. Thornton v. Roll, 118 Ill.
v. l)unhar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868): Davis v. Atkins, 35 S.W. Rep. 271 (Ky., 1896);
Ellisen v. Coinms, 58 N. C. 57 t1859); Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. (1868);
Ram.a) v. Riddle, i Cranch 399 (. S. 1807). In such case the plaintiff's bill
may be dismi.sed without prejudice: if his fears are realized he may still have
an action in equity for its abatement, or at law for damages.
PARTNERS11P--BANKRVPTCY--PARTNER

NOT SUBJECT

To BANVKRUPTCY-

In voluntary bankruptcy proceedings against a firm, where the act of bankruptcy was the act of both members, it was held that, as a partnership is a legal entity, it may be adjudged a bankrupt irrespective of whether or not there
has been an adjudication of its members as individuals anti that, although one
partner could not be adjudicated a bankrupt because he was chiefly engaged
in farming, yet his individual estate had to be administered by the trustee of
the partnership assets. In re Duke & Son, i99 Fed. 199 (1912).
As to adjudication, this case is in accord with the unanimous view of the
authorities. The provision of the statute that "a partnership . . . . may
be adjudged a bnzskrupt," has led to the doctrine that, in bankruptcy, a partnership is an entity. In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976 (1899); In re Stein, 127 Fed.
547 (x9o4). Being an entity, a partnership may be adjudged a bankrupt without so adjudging its members individually. In re Stokes, io6 Fed. 312 (190).
And all the partners may be adjudged without adjudging the firm a bankrupt.
In re Mercur, 122 Fed. 324 (1903).
As to administration of assets, the principal case, somewhat hesitatingly
follows one of two conflicting lines of decisions. The doctrine of the principa,
case was first announced in a dictum in in re Meyer, supra, (C. C. A., 2d Cir.l
1899) and affirmed in in re Stokes, supra; Dickas v. Barnes, 14o Fed. 849 (C.,
C. A., 6th Cir., i9o5); in re Lattimer, 174 Fed. 824 (D. C., 19o9); and Francis
v. McNeal, 186 Fed. 484 (C. C. A., 3d Cir., 1911). Cf. in re Junck, x69 Fed.
481 (1909); and Mills v. Fisher & Co., 159 Fed. 897 (C. C. A 6th Cir., 19o8).
These cases hold that, if the firm is adjudged a bankrupt, all the partners, whether
adjudicated or not, must deliver over their individual assets to the partnership
trustee for administration. These cases are based upon the common law
doctrine that a partner is personally liable for all partnership debts. They
hold that clause h of § 5 of the Act applies to proceedings against the partners
as individuals only and not to proceedings against the partnership as an entity.
Opposed to these cases are those reviewed by in re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed.
363 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1907) which cites in re Blair, 99 Fed. 76 (D. C., 19oo);
in re Duguid, ioo Fed. 274 (D. C., i9oo); Strauss v. Hooper, xo5 Fed. 59o (D.
C., 1901); and in re Stein, 127 Fed. 547 (C. C. A., 7th Cir., 1904). These cases
do not deny the common liability of partners, but assert that nonadjudicated
partners can be rendered liable only by suit before, during, or after the bankruptcy proceedings against the firm. See in re Everybody's Market, 173 Fed.
These cases interpret clause h of § s to refer not only to
492 (D. C., 19o8).
proceedings against the partners as individuals, but also to proceedings against
the partnership.
A partnership may be involuntarily adjudged a bankrupt although not insolvent, as when it makes an assignment for benefit of creditors. In re Meyer,
supra; in re Bertenshaw, supra; West Co. v. Lea, 174 U. S. 594 (1898). Accordingly. Francis v. McNeal, supra, attempts to reconcile the decisions by
holding that when the partnership is insolvent, the individual estate of all partners, adjudicated or not, must be administered with the partnership estate and
by suggesting that when the partnership is solvent, the individual estates need
not be administered without adjudication.

RECENT CASES
The doctrine of the principd case leaids to the anomaly that the property
of a per.on exempt from the liability of ineoluntary adjudication, is in partnership cases liable for all debts and yct .such per-on cannot --ecure the benefits
(i the Act-a dis.harge-unless he files a voluntary petition. 2o Harvard L.
R. 389 (1907).
PLEADING--.MEND.%ENTS AFTER A% APPEAL-In an action to quiet title,
a sale on fraudulent representations being alleged, an amendment which sought
to introduce certain facts showing fraud of a different character fron that alleged in the original pleading was refused on the ground (iter alia) that it
tended to defeat the judgment and put in i-;sue facts which materially changed
the issue. Peterson v. Lincoln County, 138 N. W. Rep. 122 (Neb., 1912).

At common law an amendment to the pleadings might be made at any
time up to final judgment, even after verdict an] motion in arrest of judgment.
Ordioneaux v. Prady, 6 S. & R.. 510 (Pa., I823): State v. Marsh, 134 N. C.
184 (1903). But the right to amend existed only in the trial court, with the
appellate court exerci.ing appellate jurisdiction over such right. Accordingly
it was always necessary to make the original motion in the trial court, Thom.
v. Wilson, 24 Ind. 323 (1865), where it might still be made even after the case
had been sent up on appeal, Bronson v. R. R., ii Ore. 161 (I883). And if
error in the pleading was discovered on appeal, the record could be remanded
back to the trial court for correction. Briggs v. Rutherford, 94 Minn. 23 (1903).
Very generally, by statutory authority, the original motion is permitted in the
appellate court, to amend ordinary defects of form and variances in the pleading
when the issue between the parties is not materially altered. N. Y. Code Civ.
Pro. §§ 721-723. To prevent injustice being done the opposite party, such
amendments are allowed only when the matter was clearly an issue on trial.
and as fully litigated as though it had been raised by the pleadings. Baker v.
Sherman, 73 Vt. 26 (19oo).

It is the invariable rule that amendments in the appellate court shall be
allowed only in support of a judgment, never to reverse it; Wums v. Shaugnessy,
24 N. Y. Suppl. 271 (1893), and when an omission has been objected to in the
trial court and a judgment secured on another point, on appeal the omission
mav not be corrected to support the judgment--even when the opposite party
has been misled. Mitchell v. Miller, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 18o (1898).
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRIVATE

INSTRUCTIONS

TO SPECIAL AdENT-In

entrusting an agent with certificates of shares of stock on which he should raise
a loan, a verbal limitation on the agent's authority that the loan raised was to
be not less than a certain amount, was not a limitation binding as to third persons who acted on his apparent authority to pledge the shares for any amount.
Fry v. Smellie, III K. B. 282 (1912).

The doctrine of the principal case is unquestioned; secret or private limitations to the authority of an agent, though effectual between principal and agent.
are of no force in respect to third parties who deal with the agent on his apparent
authority. Mitchell v. Sanford, 149 Mo. App. 72 (191o). There is an apparent
conflict with a group of cases which hold that he who deals with a special agent
or one with limited authority is bound to know the extent of that authority;
Swindele v. Latham, 58 S. E. Rep. 1oo (N. C., 1907), or conversely, a special
or particular agent acting under a limited authority cannot bind his principal
if he exceeds that authority. Norton v Neviles, 54 N. E. Rep. 537 (Mass.,
1899). The conflict is more apparent than real. The special or particular
agent is clothed with authority, the extent of which it is possible for third parties
to aseertain by exercising reasonable care. The secret instructions and limitations on the agent's authority are often confidential and are not divulged under
any condition. They would seem scarcely part of his authority, but a private
stipulation between principal and agent, while the real authority must be that
given to the agent openly. When one has accredited another as his agent, in
determining the liability of the principal the question is not what authority
was intended to be given the agent, but what authority was a third person'dealling with him justified, from the acts of the principal, in believing was given him.
Griggs v. Selden, 58 Vt. 561 (1886).
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PROPERTY-ESTATES uv EN rIRTY-DIvoRcF.-When a hu~l,and and wife
hold real estate as tenants by entireties and an u.h.olute dixorce is granted, the
husband cannot maintain an actiun of assumpit again.t his divorced wife for
rents anti profits accruing after divorce. An abs-olute divorce does not change
the nature of such an ebtate. Hilt v. Hilt, 50 Pa. Superior 455 (1912).
The effect of divorce on estates bv entireties isa subject very bare ofauthorities.The law as to divorce preventLd this question from arising in the English
cases and but few cases have been reported in this country. While there is some
conflict in the decisions, yet the weight of authority is against the Pennsylvania
doctrine as laid doutn in Hilt v. Hilt. supra, which follows Alles v. Lyon, 216
Pa. 604 (1907). Lewis' Appeal, 85 Mich. 340 (1891), seems to be the only case
in accord with the Pennsylvania cases.
That divorce destroys the unity of husband and wife, and severs such estate, making them thereafter tenants in common, is held in Ilarrer v. Wallner,
8o Ill. 197 (1875); Russel v. R .-.
.l,122 Mo. 235 (1 94); Stelz v. Shreck, 128
N. Y. 263 (09);
Iopson v. Fowlkes, 92 Tenn. 697 (1892); Ames v.Norman,
4 Sneed, 683 (Tenn. 1857); Haves v. Horton, 46 Oregon, 597 (1905).
Tenancy by entireties is ditinctly an anomalous estate which grew up
under, and was made necessary by, the ancient common law idea of unity of
husband and wife. By statutes this unity has been very greatly modified if
not alnost entirely destroyed, but this particular sort of estate has not been
legislated out of existence.

SALEs-DELIVERY-PASSING OF TI"LE-A large quantity of logs, having
been delivered at the place agreed upon in the contract of sale, to be scaled and
marked, were destroyed before the exact quantity could be determined in the
manner agreed upon. The punhase price had been fixed at a certain rate per
Xooo feet. It was held that the title had passed by the delivery; and the
fact that the logs had not been scaled and marked at the time of the fire was
immaterial as affecting the question of title. That as between seller and buyer
there may be such delivery as will vest the property in the latter, though by the
terms of the contract there is something to be done afterwards to ascertain the
exact quantity to be paid for at the pri e fixed by the contract. Fee v. Emporium Luniber'Co., 50 Super. Ct. 557 (Pa., 1912).
This'is in accord with the decisions on this subject in Pennsylvania. Gonser v. Smith, 115 Pa. 452 (1886); Diehl v. McCormick, 143 Pa. 584 (1890);
Scott v. Wells, 6 Watts & S. 357 (1843); and it also expresses the prevailing
view, which is that the destruction of goods sold and delivered under a contract
of sale providing that the purchase price should be fixed by ascertaining the
quantity of the goods sold after their delivery is in no wise material to the right
of the seller to recover, though such destruction has made it impossible to ascertain the exact price stipulated for by the contract; such question is to be determined by the passing of title, which is dependent entirely upon the intent
of the parties as gathered from the contract and circumstances of the sale.
Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436 (1872); Bond v. Greenwald, 4 Heisk.
453 (Tenn., 1871); Upson v. Holmes, 51 Conn. 5oo (1883); Gill v. Benjamin, 64
Wi'is. 362 (1885); Vehmeyer v. Earl, 22 II1. App. 522 (1886); Wilson v. Shaver,
3 Ont. L. Rep. iio (19O1); Alien v. Elmore, 121 Iowa 241 (1903).

A few cases may be found which hold that where the contract is to sell by
weight, measure or count, and the goods have been destroyed before they have
been weighed, measured or counted, the seller cannot recover for goods bargained and sold, even though title has passed. Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C.
857 (1826).
Some authorities look upon the question of the transfer of title as largely
dependent upon which party to the contract has the duty of ascertaining the
quantity of the goods sold. Accordingly the rule is frequently laid down that,
where the acts of measurement, counting or weighing by the terms of the trade
are to be done by the seller, or by him and the buyer together, and, before this is
done.'the goods are destroyed, the seller will have to bear the loss though the goods
are delivered to the buyer; but if these acts are to be done by the buyer the loss
will be his. Crawford v. Smith, 7 Dana 59 (Ky., 1838); King v. Jarman, 35

RECENTr CASES
Ark. 190 (1870). L.inghain v. Eggleston. 2- Mlich. 324 (1873); Burke v. Shannon,
i9 Ky. L. R. 1170t197); Semple v. l.umb.r Co., 115N. IN'. Rep. 899 (Iowa, 1908).
TORTs-JoNT ToRT-F.ASORs-Eckman v. Lehigh & WilkesBarre Coal
Co., 237 Pa. Sup. 427 (t912). holds that ihere .everal proprietors of coal operations, acting independently, unlawfully dlump cuim into a stream by which it
is wa-hed onto the land of another, they cannot be held liable in a joint action. but each is liable severally for the proportion of the damages he caused,
and that only.
When a tort has been committed all who aid or counsel, direct or join in
the commis.iun of it are joint tort-feasors. Petrie v. L.amont, Car. & M. 93(1891),
but to make person-; joint tort-feasors they must have "concurred" in the act
complained of. Addison on Tortq, page tico. The interpretation of the word
"'concurred" has led to some conflict of authority as to the correctness of the
decision in the principal case. The majority of the decisions supiport Eckman
v. Coal Co., sn pra, and it i. -ubmitted that they are right in principle. .. e in
accord Lull v. Fox Improvement Co., 1g Wis. too (t865); Blaisdell v. Stevens,
14 Nev. 17 (1879); Miller v. lighland Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430 (t891); Dyer v.
Hutchins. 87 Tenn. t98 (1889); Adams v. flail. 2 Vt. 9 (1829). Day-v.Louisville
Coal & Coke Co.. 6o V. Va. 27 (t9o6). is flatly contra. Numerous decisions
inav l found in which the court, in pernitting an action against one of the
parties, said that the liability was both joint and several. These expressions,
however, being in the nature of obiter dicta, hardly entitle the cases to be ranked
as contra to the principal case.
TORTS-SLANDER-PRIVILEGED

OCCASION-REPETITION

OF

STATEMENTS

As EviDt.xcE OF MALIcE-The defendant, as president of a woman's club, made

slanderous statements concerning the plaintiff, another club member, at a meeting called for the purpose of trying to discover the perpetrator of certain thefts,
and later repeated the statements at similar meetings. fIeld, that the occasion
was privileged and that the repetition of the slander was not evidence bearing
on the question of malice. Hayden v. Ilalsbouch, 84 Atl. Rep. 1087 (R. I., 1912).
The rule applicable to such cases was probably best expressed by Blackburn, J., in Davies v. Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 611 (t87o), when he said: "Where a
person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests of society that he
should tell to a third person certain facts, then if he bonafide and without malice
does tell them, it is a privileged communication although it contains criminatory
matter." This statement was cited with approval by Brett, M. R., in Waller
.r. Lock, 7 Q. B. D. 621 (1881), a strong case, and forms the basis of innumerable decisions all in accord with the principal case. Knight v. Hall, 43 J. P:76 (1879); James v. Boston, 2 C. & K. 4 (1845); Stott v. Evans, 3 Times L. R.
693 (1865); Gassett v. Gilbert, 72 Mass. 94 (1856); Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns.
178 (N. Y., i8o8); McKnight v. Hasbrouck, 17 R. I. 70 (890); Montgomery
v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595 (1887); Gatis v. Kilgo, 14o N. C. lo6 (:9o6).
The privilege extends only to communications pertinent to the common
interests and necessary in protecting those interests or discharging the duty
imposed upon the party making the communication. Sewall v. Catlin, 3 Wtend.
291 (N. Y., :829).
While there would seem to be no doubt of the logical correctness of the
second part of the decision in Ilayden v. Hasbrouch, supra, but few cases axe to
be found which can be considered legal precedents for it. Shenglemeyer v.
Wright, 124 Mich. 230 (9o,), is in exact accord; Davis v. Starrett, 97 Me.
574 (:go3) seems contra. When the occasion upon which the words were repeated is absolutely privileged it is well established that their repetition cannot
be used as evidence to show malice at the former speaking. McLaughlin v.
Charles, 67 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 242 (:89); Thompson v. McCreary, 194 Pa. 32 (190W).
TRESPAS-INDEPENDE.T CONTRACTOR-The plaintiff's husband sold timber rights to the defendant's grantor, reserving certain tracts. The defendant
by contract had the timber cut and shipped by another who felled timber on
the reserved tracts. First court ruled that the defendant's rights depended upon
the contract of sale and could not relieve itself from liability by the defense of
act of an independent contractor. Ield, by a divided court, that there was no
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error in the ruling and under a plea of independent contractor the burden is
upon defendant to prove all the facts that make him who would otherwise be
a mere servant, an independent contractor. Abbott v. Sumter .umber Co.,
76 So. Rep. 146 (S. Car., 1912).
Ordinarily the question whether or not the guilty.actor is a servant or an
independent contractor is one of fact for the jury. Greenburg v. Western Imp.
Ass., 148 Cal. 126 (9o5), aft. 2o4 U. S. 359 (190'7); Socker v. Waddell, 98 Md.
43 (19o3); Banks v. So. Express Co., 73 S. Car. 211 (19o6). But where the relationship delpends, as in the principal case, upon the construction of a written
contract, the question is for the court, Rodgers v. R. R., 31 S. Car. 378 (1888);
or where the evidence is undisputed, it is for the court, Greene v. Soule, 145
Cal. 96 (19o4).
And as a general rule, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the guilty
actor to be a servant of the defendant, no matter how hard it may be. Axtell
v. R. R., 9 Idaho, S92 (1903). And in this view the principal case may b.e
thought to be extreme. Yet as was -aid in Slavton v. West End Ry., 174 Mass.
55 (899), where the defense set up was the nun-liability for the tort of an independent contractor, the barden is upon the defendant to prove that the atuor
was an independent contractor. In the principal case, the actor could only
justify his being on the premises by the contract with the defendant, and was,
therefore, prinia facie a servant.
If one cannot relieve himself of a duty imposed by legal obligation, Tarry
v. Ashton, r Q. B. ). 314 (Eng., 1876); or by statute, Hole v. Ry. Co., 6 H. &
N. 488 (Eng., 1861); neither ought one to be allowed to shizk a duty, although
negative, imposed by contract, for one cannot accept the benefit of a contract
without accepting the burden. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 (189o).
The defendant's remedy, in case he has no bond, is against the actor. Peerless M'f'g Co. v. Bagley, 126 Mich. 225 (1901).
TRIAL-VOLUNTARY NoNsUIT-TimE-Upon a trial before a district court
judge without a jury, the plaintiff has no right to submit to a voluntary nonsuit after the judge has begun to announce his decision. Wolf v. Fulton Realty
Co., 84 At. Rep. 1041 (N. J., 1912). This case is closely analogous to the one
where the trial judge has directed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant;
but the verdict has not in fact been rendered; in this situation the plaintiff has
no right to submit to a nonsuit. Dobbins v. Dittmers, 76 N. J. L. 235 (igo8).
As to the time in which a plaintiff may suffer a voluntary nonsuit there is
a difference of opinion. The common law rule is that the plaintiff may suffer
a voluntary nonsuit at any time before the jury have pronounced their verdict,
or if the cause be tried by judge alone, at any time before the judge has delivered
his judgment. Price v. Parker, I Salk. 178 (1696); Easton Bank v. Coryell,
9 Watts & S. 153 (Pa., 1844); Outhwaite v. Hudson, 7 Exch. 380 (1852); Peoples'
Bank v. Stewart, 93 N. C. 404 (1885); Helwig v. Hosmer, 73 Mich. 258 (1889);
Hoodless v. Winter, 8o Tex. 639 (1891); Jackson v. Merritt, 21 D. C. 276 (1892);
Crumley v. Lutz, 18o Pa. 476 (1897).
The rule of the majority of the courts is that a voluntary non-suit can only
be suffered before the case is submitted to the jury. Amos v. Sinnott, 5 Il.
44o (1843); Fowler v. Lawson, i5 Ark. 148 (1854); Adams v. Shephard, 24 Ill.
464 (186o); McClelland v. R. Co., 94 Ind. 276 (1883); Bank v. Lesley, 31 Fla.
56 (1893); Morrisey v. R. Co., 8o Ia. 314 (i89o); Bauman v. Whiteley, 57 N.
J. L. 487 (1895); McPherson v. Seattle Co., 53 Wash. 358 (1909); Knight v.
Ill. Cent. R. Co., ISo Fed. 368 (191o). The New York Code has a provision
to the same effect.
Still another rule has been adhered to, especially in the New England
states, that the plaintiff may take a non-suit as a matter of right before opening
his case to the jury, or to the court, when tried without the intervention of the
jury; after the case is opened, and before verdict, leave to become non-suit is
within the discretion of the court. Washburn v. Allen, 77 Me. 344 (1885);
Benoist v. Murrin, 48 Mo. 48 (1871); U. S. v. Humason, 8 Fed. 71 (x88x); Bettis v. Schreiber. 3t Minn. 329 (1883); Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. R. Co., 184
Mass. 98 (1903).

By Act of April 6, t9o3, P. L. 216, in Pa., a non-suit cannot be suffered as
a matter of right after a sealed verdict. The court may allow it in its discretion.

